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Atmospherics: Abortion Law and Philosophy
Anita L. Allen

Respect for human life finds an ultimate expression in the bond of
love the mother has for her child. (Gonzales: xx)
From the positivists the realists take the insistence on concrete data.
. . . The profession at large still shows, at times, the influence of the
natural law. . . .” (Llewellyn 1934: 212)
While we find no reliable data to measure the phenomenon, it seems
unexceptionable to conclude some women come to regret their choice
to abort the infant life they once created and sustained. . . . Severe
depression and loss of esteem can follow. . . . (Gonzales: xx)
Police officers with cadaver-sniffing dogs, shovels and a backhoe dug
in the backyard of a home Monday where the bodies of four infants
have been found since last week. The police say the infants belong to
Christy L. Freeman, 37, a taxi company owner and mother of four.
Ms. Freeman has been charged with murder in the death of one of the
infants, a male fetus in the 26th week of gestation found in a vanity
under a bathroom sink. (AP Report 2007: A15)

In 1934, Karl N. Llewellyn published a lively essay trumpeting the dawn of legal realism,
“On Philosophy in American Law.” The charm of his defective little piece is its style and audacity.
A philosopher might be seduced into reading Llewellyn’s essay by its title; but one soon learns that
by “philosophy” Llewellyn only meant “atmosphere.” (Llewellyn 1934: 206) His concerns were
the “general approaches” taken by practitioners, who may not even be aware of having general
approaches. (Ibid) Llewellyn paired an anemic concept of philosophy with a pumped-up conception
of law. Llewellyn’s “law” included anything that reflects the “ways of the law guild at large” – the
ways of judges, legislators, regulators, and enforcers. (Ibid)
Whether atmospherics conform to coherent sets of theoretical ideas of the sort a Richard
Posner or Ronald Dworkin might defend was not Llewellyn’s question. Yet he credited intellectual
judges and scholars, especially Oliver Wendell Holmes, Roscoe Pound and Benjamin Cardozo, with
roles in making the embrace of realism headier than a law guild’s unconscious groping for solutions.
(Ibid: 210-12). A story could be told (but not here) about academic philosophy’s contributions to
American law. Contemporary philosophers have modestly contributed logical and conceptual
clarity; economists and statisticians may have contributed more.
Llewellyn argued that the legal philosophies implicit in American legal practice had been
natural law, positivism and realism, each adopted in response to felt needs of a time. We must
reckon with many other implicit “philosophies” to understand the workings of the law guild, not the

least of which has been racism. Others, maternalism and paternalism, my foci here, persist in
American law, despite women’s progress toward equality. Both maternalism and paternalism were
strikingly present in a recent decision of the U.S. Supreme Court, Gonzales v. Carhart, upholding
the federal Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act.
I.
Natural law, Llewellyn said, was adopted in response to the needs of a new nation lacking
precedents of its own and short on hospitality for the tradition of British law. Unashamed reliance
upon “right reason” was an expression of the founding generation’s self-confidence and rebellion
against British rule. (Ibid: 206-07) Like natural law, racism and maternalism/paternalism were
conceptual “needs” of a newly independent federation of slaveholding patriots intent on dominating
the swatches of North America grabbed from the Indians. White women, slaves and indigenous
Americans did not immediately benefit from the atmospherics of divinely inspired natural law. The
original constitution defined non-whites out of full citizenship, and overlooked women altogether.1
Positivism bloomed in the late 19th century, Llewellyn argued. Capitalist industrialism called
for pragmatic law-making, especially within private law. Positivism legitimates rules put into place
by the sovereign. Stressing allegiance to rules and precedent, positivism fostered stability more than
justice. Natural law had been unkind to the powerless, and positivism was, too. Complemented by
racism, raw “buccaneer” self-interest, as Llewellyn called it, spelled major trouble. For example,
West coast towns and cities passed laws to eliminate the competition from their Chinese immigrant
communities – laws prohibiting laundries built of wood and carrying things on poles. The Chinese
were rounded up and their property confiscated or burned. In principle, legal positivism is a twoway street. Indeed, some Chinese immigrants who sued for restitution under positive law theories
of tort and contract won. (Pfaelzer 2008) Although the letter of law strictly applied sometimes helps
the little guys, law will be manipulated by Power to serve the interests of Power. Positivism in the
air may help explain Plessy v. Ferguson. The Supreme Court read the law of equal protection
ungenerously, so as virtually to re-enslave southern blacks through demeaning segregation.
According to Llewellyn, realism evolved in response to the needs of the 20th century. The
little guys organized and flexed muscle. Popular movements – labor, farm workers, and small
business among them – demanded policies of protection and reform. The gospel of realism teaches
that law is an instrument of power that can be educated with hard fact and marshaled through
politics for social improvement and a more complete democracy. From its cynical (Holmes) and
ethical (Pound) variants, and its sociological roots, realism emerged (with the help of Cardozo) to
enable the legal system to solicit “more exact knowledge” for policy-making. (Llewellyn 1934:
212) Realism suits us as a nation of pragmatists compelled to govern the powerful and the powerless
alike, Llewellyn contended. In 1934 realism had found “yet little echo among judges”; nonetheless,
it came into its own as Llewellyn predicted because it was “much closer than any others to the actual
behavior of the better bar.” (Ibid) The realist atmospheric survives in progressive legal theory and
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mainstream legal practice. But positivism is a vital sibling and natural law is good for an occasional
cameo.
II.
The big three philosophies – natural law, positivism and realism – have never exhausted the
atmospherics of American law. It is implausible to reduce to only three all of the “philosophies”
immanent in the ways of the law guild. Moralism, for example, was evident in Anthony Comstock’s
legal innovations targeting pornography, contraception and abortion. Llewellyn neglected the
challenge to moralistic paternalism embodied both by Margaret Sanger’s battle against Comstockera laws and the successful reform movement for women’s suffrage. Outside the shadows, there
are no women in Llewellyn’s story of American legal philosophy, not even when he describes the
push for democratizing reforms in the early 20th century. Maternalism and paternalism are major
atmospherics, especially noteworthy for the injustice they have, and continue, to do. Women are
dragged down by the law’s implicit paternalism (its tendency to control the lives of individuals,
nominally for their own good) and maternalism (its assumption that bearing children and caring for
others is the natural and optimal role of women).
In Gonzales v. Carhart the U.S. Supreme Court upheld a federal abortion prohibition.
Congress enacted a Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act, signed into law by President George W. Bush
in 2003. Under the ban, physicians can be punished for knowingly performing an abortion using
techniques labeled “partial-birth abortion.” Congress was attempting to bring an end to a class of
procedures that second- and third-trimester abortion providers sometimes term D&X (short for
“dilation and extraction”) or intact D&E (short for “intact dilation and evacuation”).2 Written by
Justice Anthony Kennedy, the majority opinion in Gonzales is mired in the atmospherics of
maternalism and paternalism. Justice Kennedy’s maternalism and paternalism do not countenance
the possibility that a sane and ethical woman could knowingly approve the destruction of her living
fetus once it has been coaxed halfway through her cervix.
The Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act criminalizes abortions in which a living viable or living
non-viable fetus is killed after its head or abdomen passes from the womb through the cervix. The
Act includes an exception for abortions necessary to save the lives of pregnant women, but no
exception for women’s health. Abortion-rights advocacy groups went to court to oppose the
“partial-birth” ban.3 They feared the Act would set the nation on a slippery slope toward the recriminalization of most abortions. They also feared that authorities could interpret the Act to
prohibit medically safe best practices. The Act’s opponents maintained before the Supreme Court
that the Act was unconstitutionally vague, like the Nebraska law the Court struck down a few years
earlier in Stenberg vs. Carhart. Opponents further argued that by proscribing medically safe and
popular D&E abortions of non-viable fetuses and by not including a maternal health exception, the
Act imposed an “undue burden” on the woman’s right to choose, in violation of Planned Parenthood
v. Casey.
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Since Roe v. Wade, women in the United States have enjoyed a right against categorical
criminalization of medically safe abortions. At least one million U.S. women obtain “surgical” or
“medical” abortions each year from professional health care providers. Typical abortions are $300
“surgical” abortions obtained in the first-trimester of pregnancy. Most surgical abortions involve
inserting a device through the woman’s cervix and suctioning the contents of the uterus. In a
“medical” abortion a woman who is one to two months pregnant ingests prescribed drugs (usually
methotrexate and mifepristone) that cause her fetus to be expelled from her body over a period of
days in a manner akin to a natural spontaneous miscarriage.
The essential holding of Roe v. Wade was affirmed in 1992 in Planned Parenthood v. Casey.
But Casey also held that government may establish abortion restrictions, including waiting periods,
that do not “unduly burden” the right to elect abortion.4 Even before Casey, the Court had
concluded that states and the federal government may express through their laws and policies a
preference for childbearing over abortion.5 States may assert an interest in protecting the life from
the moment of conception and may regulate abortion in the interest of women’s health. Abortion
“privacy” is being replaced by abortion paternalism.
The Gonzales Court held 5 to 4 that the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act is constitutionally
valid. Justice Kennedy reasoned, first, that the Act is not unconstitutionally vague since “Doctors
performing D&E will know that if they do not deliver a living fetus to an anatomical landmark they
will not face criminal liability.” (Gonzales: xx) Second, the Act is not unduly burdensome because
it does not prohibit most or all abortions and cannot be read to do so. The Act proscribes only those
D&E abortions performed both intentionally (not accidentally) and by killing an intact fetus whose
head (or abdomen) has been delivered past the cervix. Justice Kennedy acknowledged that Casey
upheld Roe. Yet, under the holding of Casey, “[r]egulations which do no more than create a
structural mechanism by which the State, or the parent or guardian of a minor, may express profound
respect for the life of the unborn are permitted, if they are not a substantial obstacle to the woman’s
exercise of the right to choose.” (Ibid: xx) Justice Kennedy further argued that the Act does not
require a health exception because there are alternatives to the banned procedure. The Court noted
that neither an injection to induce vaginal expulsion of a non-viable living fetus, nor surgery to
remove the non-viable fetus, is banned by the Act.
III.
Kennedy’s opinion is striking for the extent of its paternalism and maternalism. According
to the justice, “Respect for human life finds an ultimate expression in the bond of love the mother
has for her child.” (Ibid: xx) Might respect for human life find another ultimate expression in
deference governments shows toward the morally autonomous decisions adult women and their
partners make about their own lives and families? Kennedy takes the ascribed “bond of love” to
explain why women must surely go a little crazy after an abortion and especially a partial-birth
abortion.
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Kennedy had no hard data to support his maternalist assumptions. But in a superficially
realist spirit of adjudication-guided-by-data Kennedy provided two medical professionals’
descriptions of “partial-birth” abortion. The first was a clinical account of the abortionist’s
technique:
The doctor, often guided by ultrasound, inserts grasping forceps through the woman's
cervix and into the uterus to grab the fetus. The doctor grips a fetal part with the
forceps and pulls it …through the cervix and vagina… .The friction causes the fetus
to tear apart. For example, a leg might be ripped off the fetus as it is pulled through
the cervix and out of the woman. . . . Once the fetus has been evacuated, the placenta
and any remaining fetal material are suctioned or scraped out of the uterus. The
doctor examines the different parts to ensure the entire fetal body has been removed.
. . . (Ibid: xx)
The second account of abortion was a more feminine narrative, appropriately sincere and tenderhearted. He quoted a nurse who witnessed a procedure to abort a 26-week old “baby” performed
by a Dr. W. Martin Haskell:
Dr. Haskell went in with forceps and grabbed the baby's legs and pulled them down
into the birth canal. Then he delivered the baby's body and the arms – everything but
the head. The doctor kept the head right inside the uterus. . . . The baby’s little
fingers were clasping and unclasping, and his little feet were kicking. Then the
doctor stuck the scissors in the back of his head, and the baby’s arms jerked out, like
a startle reaction, like a flinch, like a baby does when he thinks he is going to fall.
The doctor opened up the scissors, stuck a high-powered suction tube into the
opening, and sucked the baby’s brains out. Now the baby went completely limp. .
. . He cut the umbilical cord and delivered the placenta. He threw the baby in a pan,
along with the placenta and the instruments he had just used. (Ibid: xx)
Justice Kennedy was working on emotions, as much as offering facts. He was inviting readers to
share his belief that the intact D&E or D&X procedures on living fetuses are ghoulish, something
a true “mother” would recoil at discovering her physician had done to her unborn “child.” In
Kennedy’s words:
The State has an interest in ensuring so grave a choice is well informed. It is selfevident that a mother who comes to regret her choice to abort must struggle with
grief more anguished and sorrow more profound when she learns, only after the
event, what she once did not know: that she allowed a doctor to pierce the skull and
vacuum the fast-developing brain of her unborn child, a child assuming the human
form. (Ibid: xx)
Justice Kennedy knows that “mothers” voluntarily seek out physicians to fatally abort their children.
Yet, he wants to believe they are naturally tender on matters relating to children. Kennedy surmises
that “mothers” would likely be disturbed by partial-birth abortion and unwilling to consent to the
D&X procedure if properly disclosed by a physician. There are many reasons to doubt this
assumption. First of all, a woman whose belly is swollen with a pregnancy knows what lies therein

(namely, a living human form); and she knows that there are only a limited number of ways to
remove it. When abortion was illegal, a desperate woman might insert coat hangers and knitting
needles through her own cervix to kill her fetus. She might fling herself down flights of stairs
toward the same end. Women understand basic anatomy and are grateful that modern physicians
can safely do what they themselves cannot safely do on their own. Women generally understand,
I would submit, that after the first trimester of pregnancy, the body of a fetus (baby) has to be
physically removed or made to come out on its own, through a small opening. Women know that
physicians do not use lasers beams to neatly and painlessly vaporize the unwanted unborn.
Second, a woman might rationally believe that the D&X procedure is the best and safest
procedure available for the termination of a pregnancy she believes is vitally important to herself
or loved ones. This belief may override any tendency toward squeamishness. A woman may regard
a partial-birth abortion as a lesser of two evils, if an evil at all. Women’s morality of killing as
applied to abortion is like men’s morality of killing applied to war – subtle and contextual.
Third, women are not especially squeamish about surgical procedures. Women elect
cosmetic procedures on their own bodies that are extremely risky, invasive and gruesome to witness
and describe. Women authorize invasive heart, brain and transplant surgeries on their children,
disabled spouses and elderly parents, when they believe removing the top of a skill, sawing open a
sternum or taking out a liver, is the best option. Women are accustomed to blood and tissue exiting
their vaginas, as part of the menses. Some women prefer untidy, painful drawn-out medical
abortions despite the requirement that they examine bloody discharge from their own bodies to look
for the expelled embryo.
It is not the culture of medicine for physicians to be as explicit with patients as they are with
one another. Still, health-care consumers appreciate fully informed consent. Many people, male
and female, who discover that their consent to a medical procedure was not fully informed are angry
or unhappy. The common law validates these reactions by recognizing that a procedure performed
without informed consent is battery and medical negligence. We do not ordinarily think that we
should ban elective or medically necessary surgical procedures because they could potentially be
performed without fully informed consent. We typically demand fully informed consent instead.
Yet Justice Kennedy seemed to reason that the possibility that physicians will not spell out the
details of the D&X abortion technique is a reason to ban the technique altogether.
IV.
She a mother and the sole woman on the Supreme Court after the retirement of Justice
Sandra Day O’Connor, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg could see through Kennedy’s analysis. She
recognized Kennedy’s maternalism and paternalism for what they are. “This way of thinking,” she
wrote in an animated dissent, “reflects ancient notions about women’s place in the family and under
the Constitution—ideas that have long since been discredited.” She appropriately cited the
discredited Muller v. Oregon, which upheld “protective” legislation imposing work-hour limitations
on women in view of the supposed “physical structure and a proper discharge of her maternal
funct[ion].” (Muller: 422-23) Ginsburg also cited the infamous Bradwell v. State, in which the
Supreme Court upheld an Illinois statute denying women the right to practice law. Citing (his
conception of) natural law, Justice Bradley concurred in Bradwell:

Man is, or should be, woman’s protector and defender. The natural and proper
timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female sex evidently unfits it for many
of the occupations of civil life. . . . The paramount destiny and mission of woman are
to fulfil[l] the noble and benign offices of wife and mother.” (Bradwell: 141)
Bradwell rather than Casey is the real precedent for Justice Kennedy’s analysis in Gonzales.
Justice Kennedy was sadly out of step with the times and with court decisions of recent decades that
disallow “archaic and overbroad generalizations . . . such as assumptions as to [women’s]
dependency” (Califano: 207) and “overbroad generalizations” about the “talents, capacities, or
preferences” of women that “have . . . impeded . . . women’s progress toward full citizenship stature
throughout our Nation’s history.” (U.S. v. Virginia: 543, n.12) Kennedy seemed to miss the
egalitarian strand of Casey, which he repeatedly cited to support restrictions on abortion. Justice
Ginsburg made the point:
Though today’s majority may regard women’s feelings on the matter as “selfevident,” this Court has repeatedly confirmed that “[t]he destiny of the woman must
be shaped … on her own conception of her spiritual imperatives and her place in
society.” Casey, 505 U. S., at 852. See also id., at 877 (plurality opinion) (“[M]eans
chosen by the State to further the interest in potential life must be calculated to
inform the woman’s free choice, not hinder it.”). (Gonzales: xx)
Kennedy set aside realism’s call for progressive reforms and scientific data in favor of natural law’s
self-evident metaphysic of true womanhood. Maternalism and paternalism demands unselfish
motherhood and, for women, the guidance of male superiors. It is notable that the Partial Birth
Abortion Ban Act criminalizes the conduct of abortionists, but not their female patients who are
presumed to be uninformed or misinformed and therefore innocent. But women seeking abortions
are probably no less informed that women seeking other medical procedures. They should not be
presumed victims of cruel-minded clinicians wielding scissors of destruction. They should get no
free pass from complicity and responsibility.
V.
Paternalism insults pregnant women, who make life-shaping choices every day. Women
decide whether to place senile parents in a nursing home and pull the plug on their life support.
Women decide whether to authorize experimental surgery for their children, and whether to prefer
mastectomy to lumpectomy for themselves. Lawmakers should not suppose that special
paternalistic intervention is needed in the abortion context that is not needed elsewhere when
important decisions must be made. Where are all the guardians of women’s safety when they are
being sold risky variable-rate mortgages?
Today, American society seems prepared to presume women’s competence to run their own
lives and run for president; but abortion opponents rush to assume that women’s psychological
health must be in jeopardy if they abort. True women must naturally regret abortions, find them
depressing. Women must therefore be discouraged from abortion, led to alternatives like horses to
water. Ginsburg’s dissent in Gonzales broke through all the tired, twisted 19th century nonsense of

women’s health.
Of course a small minority of women bent on terminating the lives of their fetuses may well
need paternalistic intervention. Women with mental illnesses, for example, may be unable to manage
pregnancy on their own. A 37-year old business-woman with four living children, Christy Freeman
hid four dead fetuses on her property. Freeman may have intentionally caused four separate stillborn
births. Or maybe products of natural miscarriages were a kind of fetish for her disjointed
maternalism. The four corpses were discovered after Freeman, covered with bruises and showing
signs of having given birth, appeared at a hospital near her Ocean City, Maryland home without a
baby. Police discovered a recently deceased 26-week old male fetus in Freeman’s home wrapped
in a towel under her bathroom vanity, another in her Winnebago, and two others wrapped in plastic
in a trunk. Freeman was charged with the murder of the recently deceased male fetus, although she:
told police she had delivered a deformed baby, which she called “gloopity glop,” and
that she had flushed the fetus down the toilet. According to the charging documents,
though, the baby was a “viable fetus/infant,” with hands, feet and facial features.
(“Investigators”)
A minority of women need to be protected from self-harm and cruelty. We can reject maternalism
and paternalism in abortion law without denying this reality. Some unfortunate women like Christy
Freeman need serious help making choices and coping with the consequences of their choices, but
the Court should not water-down Roe v. Wade on their account.
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